St. John's Law Review
Volume 42, October 1967, Number 2

Article 32

DRL § 236: Impact on Support Proceedings in Family Court
St. John's Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

SP. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 4:2

This is precisely the situation CPLR 1007 was meant to
prevent. However, the court in this case appears to have had
no alternative since the defendant had contracted away his right
to judicial resolution of disputes. This decision stands as a
warning against careless drafting of arbitration agreements. This
unfortunate situation could have been avoided by a clause exempting from arbitration disputes originating in suits against the
general contractor. Under such a clause, the parties could still
arbitrate the many disputes that would be solely inter se. This
suggested provision must be clear and express since, as this case
indicates, the courts will not find an implied one.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW

DRL § 236: Impact on support proceedings in Family Court.
While the Family Court is powerless to entertain matrimonial
actions, it does have the power under Section 412 of the Family
Court Act to order support of the wife. The award may be on
a minimum "public charge" basis, i.e., based on preventing the
wife from becoming a public charge, or, in the court's discretion,
it may be based on the husband's ability to pay.'42 Although the
Family Court has independent discretion, it has usually followed
43
certain criteria used by the supreme court in matrimonial actions.1
Prior to section 236, the rule in the supreme court had been
that where the wife lost her separation action due to her
voluntarily living apart, she was not entitled to support. 44 Following the supreme court's direction, the Family Court denied support
on a "means" basis where the wife was voluntarily living apart. 45
Since the adoption of Section 236 of the Domestic Relations
Law,'146 the supreme court has been more liberal in awarding
142Section 412 of the Family Court Act provides that: "[a] husband is
chargeable with the support of his wife and, if possessed of sufficient
means . . . , may be required to pay for her support a fair and reasonable
sum, as the court may determine, having due regard to the circumstances

of the respective parties" (emphasis added).
143Zunder v. Zunder, 187 Misc. 557, 62 N.Y.S.2d 776 (Dom. Rel. Ct.
Bronx County 1946); Kenneson v. Kenneson, 178 Misc. 832, 36 N.Y.S.2d
676 (Dom. Rel. Ct. Bronx County 1942).
'44 Batchelor v. Batchelor, 295 N.Y. 544, 68 N.E.2d 681 (1946); Solomon
v. Solomon, 290 N.Y. 337, 49 N.E.2d 470 (1943); Roosevelt v. Roosevelt,
13 App. Div. 2d 334, 216 N.Y.S.2d 604 (1st Dep't 1961).
145Zunder v. Zunder, 187 Misc. 557, 62 N.Y.S.2d 776 (Dom. Rel. Ct.
Bronx County 1946).
the court may direct the husband
146 Section 236 provides that "...
to provide suitably for the support of the wife as, in the court's discretion,
justice requires, having regard to the circumstances of the case and of
the respective parties. . . . Such direction may be made . . . notwith-

standing that the court refuses to grant the relief requested by the wife
(emphasis added).
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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY

alimony. Section 236 was applied in Brownstein v. Brownstein147
to allow alimony even though separation was denied because the
husband and wife were living apart by mutual consent. Accordingly, section 236 has had a liberalizing influence on the Family
Court. In Steinberg v. Steinberg, 48 the Court of Appeals stated
that the change in public policy as enunciated in section 236
was projected also into the Family Court. It was held that
Section 236 of the Domestic Relations Law similarly authorized
the Family Court to award support on a "means" basis under
Section 412 of the Family Court Act even though the parties
were voluntarily living apart.
Steinberg, it is submitted, is the precurser of changing law in
the Family Court that will be indirectly effected by the liberal
provisions of the Domestic Relations Law.
DRL § 240:

Failure to obey child support order not punishable
by contempt.

Under Section 240 of the Domestic Relations Law a court may,
in a habeas corpus proceeding brought to obtain custody or visitation
1 49
rights, order a parent to provide for the support of his child.

However, in Feit v. Feit,"50 the supreme court dismissed a wife's
petition to punish her husband for contempt for failing to make
child support payments ordered in such a proceeding.
Section 245 of the Domestic Relations Law makes child
support orders issued in matrimonial actions enforceable by contempt. Although it felt that it was merely a legislative oversight
that a similar provision was not made for such orders issued in
habeas corpus proceedings, the court was reluctant to hold the
husband in contempt. 15
Until section 245 could be amended, it was suggested that
CPLR 7006 be used to enforce orders arising out of habeas corpus
proceedings." 2 However, it appears that CPLR 7006 can be
used only to compel production of the "corpus" and not compliance

App. Div. 2d 205, 263 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1st Dep't 1966).
N.Y.2d 492, 223 N.E.2d 553, 277 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1966).
149 It should be noted that before the enactment of Domestic Relations
Law §§237(b), 240, no award of support was available for a child in a
habeas corpus proceeding. See 7B McKiNNE's CPLR 203, commentary
14725
148 18

361-64 (1964).
-052 Misc. 2d 829, 276 N.Y.S.2d 668 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1967).
'' Id. at 829-30, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 669.

152Ibid.

